Faleh Abdul-Jabbar: No Innate Tribalism Faleh Abdul-Jabbar is considered one of the most prominent contemporary Iraqi social scientists. In his writings he tackles theories on the creation of the Iraqi state, democratic values, cultures of violence, concepts of Islam, secularism and civil society. He currently lives in Beirut, where he has established the Strategic Studies Institute. Abdul-Jabbar has published widely in Arabic and English, the most recent being “'Social and Cultural Sources of Violence” (al-Furat Publishing House, 2008).

Niqash met with Abdul-Jabbar in Beirut during a training session for young Iraqis working in the field of sociological research. During the interview, Abdul-Jabbar discussed his understanding of state-tribal relations

Niqash: In the 1950s, Iraqi sociologist Ali al-Wardi said that the central struggle is between Bedouin nomadism and urban civilization. Are we still living in the midst of this struggle?

Abdul-Jabbar: My answer is yes and no. There are different systems of values, ways of living, social organization, patterns of religion, etc between urban and non-urban cultures. The non-urban culture is no longer Bedouin but has become rural. There are many large rural pockets in big cities that we can clearly see in the capital city of Baghdad, Basra, Mosul and Erbil. Al-Wardi was talking about Bedouin nomadism but we are today talking about a rural culture. Al-Wardi saw the blatant antagonism within every Iraqi individual as a kind of ambivalent behavior, but I think this only applies to central transitional groups living in the middle of rural and urban areas. Lastly, al-Wardi considers Bedouin nomadism-civilization dualism not as a product of cultural conflict between tribalism and urbanism (as described by Ibn Khaldun), but as a result of a convergence between our civilization and western civilization. In other words, he describes our civilization as entirely Bedouin and disregards Ibn Khaldun’s theory of the split-culture between tribalism and urbanism. This is a systematic and historic mistake. But al-Wardi’s line of thought remains of great importance in stimulating discussion.

Niqash: Didn’t the formation of the Iraqi state in 1921 mark the entry point of tribal relations into the political system of Iraq?

Abdul-Jabbar: On the contrary, the creation of the Iraqi state in 1921 contributed to the legitimization of the historic disintegration of tribes: agricultural stability, the emergence of private property, migration to cities, the emergence of private owners independent of their tribes, etc. We see that in parliament, the tribe became part of the parliament not the opposite because the parliament, before tribes, did not exist.

Niqash: What about the Baath Party and Saddam Hussein who built part of his authority on kinship and tribal relations? Doesn’t this suggest that tribal values swallowed up the state and its institutions?

Abdul-Jabbar: Tribal values are not all bad. Their partial implementation (according to kinship relations) was the problem. Values of solidarity, financial responsibility, self defense, punishment of murderers, deterring violators of honor, preservation of land, etc were only limited to kinship while civil values mean spreading local and partial values, including tribal values too.

Tribes can contribute to state building or hinder it according to their perception of law and the monopoly of legitimate violence. The state represents the holistic and comprehensive theory in law, taxes, finances and benefits. It is an entity and idea above all sects, tribes, groups and elites. Its role is achieved through the creation of holistic/comprehensive institutions. By definition, the tribe is only a part and the two only meet when the tribe melts into the state: when partial interests melt in the holistic idea of the state and when all partial interests are met by the state.

The Baath Party placed the tribe /ruling elite above the party; the party above the law and personalized the state. Personalized states by definition are against and negate civilization.

Niqash: Today there is a kind of service-exchange between tribes and the Iraqi government as shown by the Awakenings. How do you interpret the relations between the two?

Abdul-Jabbar: There is an old rule that says the more powerful the state, the weaker local armed groups, but the opposite is true. In transitional phases, the state is not completely absent, giving dominance to local forces. It is not well established to fully control a city, a militia or a tribe. In such a situation, the state is not strong enough to spread its control. In a phase like this, the state buys the military services of local forces as a first step towards coexistence on the path to civil peace.

Niqash: On the social level, are there qualified societal sectors or forces capable of creating a local balance with tribal and religious authority?

Abdul-Jabbar: There are forces in Iraq which oppose tribalism and the authority of religious leaders. Paradoxically, these forces come from within these structures. For example, the disintegration of tribes and competition between them has created forces who oppose tribalism from within the tribes. But, the main force comes from the state bureaucracy when its purpose and aim becomes that of establishing the idea of the state. With regard to religious figures, the absence of a central institution (similar to the Vatican) divides religion into sects, power centers, and multiple movements. This in itself prevents the possibility of imposing a religious monopoly. But the main opponents of religious monopoly are the state, as an apparatus that needs secular pragmatism in order to function, and the newly emerging middle class.

The current problem in Iraq lies in the fact that the identity crisis has made the middle class pursue a sectarian Islamic identity which is fragmented in nature, internally turbulent and full of conflict.

Sectarian differences are originally cultural differences, but were politicized under the Baath party. After April 2003, politicization became armed. Today, some segments of the middle class are adopting the Iraqi identity as a cross-denominational tool to prevail over the politicization of religion. But the process is painfully slow.

Niqash: Some say that there is “collective innate tribalism” directing and controlling the fate of Iraqi society. What are the means to overcome tribal traditions and enhance chances of creating a civil society?

Abdul-Jabbar: There is no “innate tribalism,” but a transitional mixed system of values. Tribes are the first to overpass tribal values. Consider the new tribal unions; they have their own by-laws, general assemblies, conditions of membership and elections. These are tribes in transition into civil entities. They gather tribal and civil virtues. There are of course those who combine tribal traditions and civil vices (such as the mafia, kidnapping gangs, etc).

The only way to overcome these divisions is through the creation of civil institutions; writers’ unions, constitutional courts, federation of industries, chambers of commerce, trade unions and associations. Institutions based on general and comprehensive rules and this will take time. We have been building these institutions since the days of Medhat Basha in 1869, and then we started destroying them in 1963 with the first Baath coup. Today, after all this destruction, we should not mourn as we look at the ruins, but we should seek to restore institutional structures. We have no other choices.