On May 1st, Ahmet Davutoglu, the Turkish envoy met Iraqi Kurdistan’s regional Prime Minister Massoud Barzani. The following day, Turkish planes launched a bombing campaign against locations within Iraqi Kurdistan’s territories, targeting the media center of the Free Life Party of Kurdistan (PJAK), an Iranian group that shares the same goals as the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). The bombing resulted in the death of six Kurdish fighters working at the centre said the PJAK.

In a press conference held at the Kurdish Institute in Brussels, PJAK leader Haji Ahmadi, criticized what he described as US “intelligence assistance” enabling Turkey to carry out the attacks. He called the assistance a “profound service to the Iranian regime because we aim at democratizing and solving the Kurdish question in Iran.” Ahmadi also criticized the silence of Kurdistan’s Regional Government, saying, “it is a crime; it means that [the government] is comfortable [with the air raids]. A practical step should be taken beyond verbal condemnation.”

Iraq's Kurdish leaders have often reiterated that they “will not allow the realization of the Turkish agenda in Iraq,” and that they “will not yield to Turkish pressure.” Previously, Turkey refused to meet Iraqi Kurdish leaders while bombing the region. Now, things have changed and Turkey is meeting the leaders while bombing them the same time. Although the bombing does not target the two major Kurdish parties, it clearly targets Kurdish gains and the Kurdish future.

It seems that part of Turkey’s agenda in Iraq has been successful with the postponement of article 140. Moreover, Turkey is seeking to use Iran and political instruments (the Supreme Council, Dawa Party, Sadr stream and al-Tawafuq), to block the oil law which would allow the Kurdish Region to invest in oil fields discovered in its territory without the interference of the central government. The recent visit of the Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to Istanbul came as the two countries seek to coordinate their efforts on the Kurdish question.

The remaining issue on the Turkish agenda is attacking and eliminating PKK military bases along the Iraqi-Iranian borders. Now, it seems that this demand is also close to success, but this time through a deal reached with Iraq’s Kurdish leadership itself.

Months ago, Fareed Asasard, a prominent leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan Party (PUK) and director of Kurdistan’s Strategic Studies Center, told Kurdistan’s ASO Newspaper of an imminent deal to be concluded between the Kurdish Region and Turkey. He said that if Kurdish leaders compromised on the oil law, the region will gain “Turkey’s friendship” in dealing with the issue of Kirkuk and PKK camps along the borders. He said that meetings between the two sides was considered by some Kurdish figures as an “official Turkish recognition of the Kurdish Region,” an important step seeing as Turkey refuses even to allow aircraft carrying the region’s flag to pass through its airspace.

According to Asasard the regional government does not yet have enough power to close PKK camps and Turkey is therefore hoping to get government permission to carry out the job itself – as it has been doing On this matter, Asasard says that “international law supports Turkey’s position regarding the PKK’s presence in Iraq.” But at the same time, Asasard forgets that international law does not permit Turkey to interfere in Iraqi affairs, be it in oil matters or Kirkuk. Any such concessions are violations of the Iraqi constitution and Iraq’s sovereignty.

While Asasard calls Turkey’s intervention a “disgrace and a black scar on the history of Iraqi Kurdistan and its leadership,” he nonetheless justifies the potential deal, saying that “Turkey is Iraqi Kurdistan’s gateway to the European Union. It is an important state in the region and its strategic role cannot be overlooked in the province’s future. Therefore, the government may not interfere in response to the military action against the PKK.”

Fearing a strengthened Kurdish region Turkey is opposed to many of the Kurds ambitions, however according to Asasard if the regional government shows a willingness to calm their worries, “Turkey may show some flexibility… and thus, Iraqi Kurds will gain Turkey’s amity.”

In light of the above, Asasard says the Kurdistan leadership is inclined to accept Turkey’s aims in Iraq in return for more formal recognition of the Kurdish region.

Yet, critics have asked whether Asasard’s view is not short-sighted. For if the Kurdish region acquiesces to Turkey’s demands on the PKK, the oil law, and Kirkuk, and if they sacrifice these three essential issues, how can the Kurdish region fortify itself against future Turkish demands? For some, any deal along the lines suggested by Asasard would be a serious strategic mistake that would threaten Kurdish gains and might even revive an internal Kurdish-Kurdish war.

Moreover, if Kurds are helpless to such an extent why all this clamor about “steadfastness and confrontation” in facing the Turkish agenda? Where is Kurdish diplomacy and the strength derived from the Kurdish-American relationship ask critics.